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I.  INTRODUCTION 
―[M]orality [i]s essential to the well-being of society 
and . . . encouragement of religion [i]s the best way to foster 
morality.‖ 
Justice Antonin Scalia
1
 
 
Religious accommodation doctrine is ripe for another round at the 
Supreme Court.  Not since several landmark rulings in the 1970s and 1980s 
has the Court reviewed the Title VII statutory mandate that employers must 
accommodate religion in the workplace.
2
  Meanwhile, with the Court‘s 
personnel changes since then, the Court‘s Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
has shifted significantly toward accommodating more religion in the public 
sphere (e.g., religious displays on government property and public funding of 
religious activities).  Thus, when the religious accommodation law is 
reviewed by the Court again, in order for the Court‘s Title VII workplace 
jurisprudence to be consistent with its shift toward supporting religious 
expression, the Court is likely to support more protection for religious 
workers. 
Analogizing workers‘ statutory religious rights to fundamental 
constitutional rights makes sense for two reasons.  First, religion is given 
special protection under a variety of constitutional and statutory doctrines and 
is especially important to the current majority of Justices.  Second, a person‘s 
religious identity, although mutable, is a fundamental personal decision on par 
with recognized fundamental rights such as marriage and procreation. 
Religion matters to people.  It matters a great deal to religious observers 
who wish to be free from discrimination and who believe the law should 
protect them from harassment and discrimination when they express 
themselves.  This is especially and most frequently true for observers of 
minority religions.
3
  It matters to those who do not ascribe to any religion 
 
1. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 887 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 
the Framers of the United States Constitution). 
2. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2000); Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. 
Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1986). 
3. In evaluating the rights of religious observers, it is important to note that discrimination and 
harassment of observers of minority religions most forcefully underscores the importance of legal 
protection.  See, e.g., Bilal Zaheer, Accommodating Minority Religions Under Title VII: How 
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because they want to be assured that religion is not encroaching on their right 
to a religious-neutral government and to live a life free from unwanted 
harassment or bias.  This tension plays out most forcefully in two places in 
American society: the public sphere and the workplace.  The public sphere is 
the forum where communities gather and express certain (often majority but 
also sometimes controversial) viewpoints.  Yet the workplace is where most 
people spend most of their waking time and therefore bump up against others 
of different views most frequently. 
Read at face value, the Free Exercise Clause protects religious expression 
against governmental power, while the Establishment Clause bars government 
from adopting a religion itself.  In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized in 
First Amendment case law that the Constitution does not work to ―constrain a 
worker to abandon his religious convictions‖ in the workplace.4  In the private 
sector, Title VII has been explicitly amended to broaden protections for 
religious expression.
5
  In stark contrast to its First Amendment jurisprudence, 
the Supreme Court has given Title VII‘s protection the most narrow of 
interpretations, requiring employers to show only a de minimis burden
6
 to 
successfully avoid being required to accommodate religious workers.  In 
response, members of Congress have repeatedly tried to strengthen those 
protections through various iterations of the Workplace Religious Freedom 
Act.
7
 
In the public sphere, courts allow many flowers to bloom.  Nativity scenes 
next to menorahs,
8
 as well as Ten Commandments displays with historical 
(rather than exclusively religious) significance are allowed to flourish in the 
 
Muslims Make the Case for a New Interpretation of Section 701(J), 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 500 
(emphasizing the unique problems that Islam, with its practice-intensive nature, presents for both 
employers and employees in trying to provide equitable accommodations to religious minorities in 
the workplace). 
4. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963). 
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(7), 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000)). 
6. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). 
 7. The Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2005, H.R. 1445, 109th Cong. (2005), S. 677, 
109th Cong. (2005), aims ―to amend title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to establish provisions 
with respect to religious accommodation in employment, and for other purposes.‖  See generally 
James A. Sonne, The Perils of Universal Accommodation: The Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 
2003 and the Affirmative Action of 147,096,000 Souls, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1023, 1026 (2004) 
(discussing widespread support for previous efforts to pass prior proposal for WRFA).  
8. E.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995) (ruling 
that the state did not violate the Establishment Clause by permitting a private party to display an 
unattended cross on the grounds of the state capitol); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater 
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989) (holding that a Chanukah menorah display next to a 
Christmas tree outside a city-county governmental building did not violate the Establishment 
Clause); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding a city‘s inclusion of a nativity scene 
in its Christmas display did not violate the Establishment Clause). 
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public domain.
9
  However, in the workplace, the Supreme Court has allowed 
employers to restrict religious expression.
10
  Legislative efforts to protect 
religious expression have been stymied by judicial refusal to protect such 
expression meaningfully.
11
  This stems from courts‘ predisposition toward 
viewing ―accommodation‖ as an entirely different concept than 
―nondiscrimination,‖ viewing the former far more skeptically than the latter. 
When faced with challenges by both religious observers and secularists, 
the Supreme Court treats the public sphere and the workplace very differently.  
What is striking is that the newly powerful conservative bloc of Justices 
(namely Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito) likely will be quick to support 
religious expression in the public sphere cases, such as McCreary County v. 
ACLU of Kentucky,
12
 yet they have joined a Court with a tradition of refusing 
to grant the same rights to observant workers.
13
  This Article explores whether 
the new Court will overturn its Title VII precedents to grant the same 
expansive religious rights in the workplace that it increasingly has granted in 
the public sphere. 
This Article makes the case for judicial recognition of respectful religious 
expression in the workplace as more consistent with the Court‘s 
 
9. E.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690–92 (2005) (ruling a Ten Commandments 
display on the grounds of the state capitol was constitutional when the display had an undeniable 
historical meaning).  But see McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 871–72 (2005) 
(holding displays of the Ten Commandments at courthouses violated the Establishment Clause when 
the counties‘ purpose was to emphasize a religious message). 
10. See, e.g., Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 67 (1986) (noting that an 
employer is not required to bear more than a de minimis cost in accommodating an employee‘s 
religious beliefs); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710–11 (1985) (ruling a state 
statute that provides Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their 
Sabbath violates the Establishment Clause); Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 84 (holding an 
employer is not required to bear more than a de minimis cost in accommodating an employee‘s 
religious beliefs); see also Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious 
Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 321 (1997) (―[In] claims that 
employers have failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiffs‘ religion by refusing to permit them 
to observe religious holy days or to dress or groom in a particular way . . . plaintiffs lose most of the 
time.  Indeed, the law seems so settled . . . that the claims are rarely, if ever, brought any more.‖).  
11. See generally Jamie Darin Prenkert & Julie Manning Magid, A Hobson’s Choice Model 
For Religious Accommodation, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 467 (2006) (discussing how Title VII‘s religious 
accommodation mandate is often ineffective). 
12. 545 U.S. at 885–912 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 692 (Scalia, J., 
concurring); id. at 692–98 (Thomas, J., concurring); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 726–33 
(2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 
687, 732–52 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631–46 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); ACLU of N.J. v. Black Horse Reg‘l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1489–97 (3d. Cir. 1996) 
(Mansmann, J., dissenting, joined by Alito, J.); Brief for the United States, Bd. of Educ. of the 
Westside Cmty. Sch. (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (No. 88-1597), 1989 WL 1127408 
(co-authored by Roberts) (arguing to the Court that religious groups should not be banned from 
meeting on school grounds). 
13. See, e.g., Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 479 U.S. at 69. 
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Establishment Clause jurisprudence and also more true to the legislative intent 
of the religious accommodation provisions of Title VII.  Respectful religious 
pluralism in the workplace should become the norm through judicial 
requirements of best practices in the workplace.  Such a view should be 
wholly supported by the majority of the Justices because it is consistent with 
their expressed views, in the Establishment Clause case law, that religion 
fosters moral good and that in a pluralistic society religious expression cannot 
automatically be deemed threatening to those with different views. 
This Article examines in Part II how religious observance is an intrinsic 
and undeniable part of many people‘s identities, and it argues that refusing to 
acknowledge observers as religious people and refusing to allow them to 
express themselves as such is similar to keeping gays and lesbians in the 
closet.  From that viewpoint, allowing religious expression is not an 
adventurous ―accommodation‖ asking for different or ―special‖ rights. 
Next, in Part III, an examination of the Supreme Court‘s jurisprudence on 
the public sphere and religion cases showcases the judicial trend of not only 
allowing, but also promoting certain religious expression in our society. 
Part IV details the refusal of courts to protect workers who express 
themselves religiously in the workplace, even though such protection is 
mandated by Title VII and consistent with the Court‘s public sphere 
Establishment Clause doctrine. 
Lastly, Part V attempts to solve this inconsistency by creating a path for 
the Supreme Court to follow: interpret Title VII‘s religious accommodation 
mandates in alignment with its Establishment Clause jurisprudence and with 
express congressional intent, an intent that is echoed in pending legislation 
that would expand protections for workers who express themselves in 
religious ways.
14
  Specifically, I propose three paths of judicial enforcement 
of respectful pluralism, which protect both religious expression and secularist 
workers from disrespectful expression. 
II.  THE IMPORTANCE OF PROTECTING RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION 
People express themselves in a multitude of ways: by dress,
15
 with 
adornments, by surrounding themselves with objects, and through discussion 
with others.  In this way, expression is not just verbal but occurs in myriad 
nonverbal associations, as the Court has noted in protecting ―symbolic 
 
14. The Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 1431, 110th Cong. (2007). 
15. See generally Gowri Ramachandran, Freedom of Dress: State and Private Regulation of 
Clothing, Hairstyle, Jewelry, Makeup, Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 MD. L. REV. 11, 13 (2006) 
(proposing a legal right to free dress); Dean B. Ziegel, Note, The Prohibition of Religious 
Observances in the Workplace, 5 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 197, 197–98 (1988) (discussing religious dress 
in the armed forces). 
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speech‖ and ―expressive conduct‖ that is nonverbal and nonwritten.16  What 
we choose to wear, what we do to our skin and hair, what adornments we 
decide to put on—these are all expressions that reflect particular intrinsic 
characteristics of core parts of ourselves that are normally not meaningfully 
filtered.  Instead, these expressions reflect who people are, what they believe, 
and in what category they hold their beliefs. 
Religious expressions in particular can communicate many deeply held 
views.  What people wear (such as a head scarf or prayer beads), what and 
whether they choose to eat (including strict dietary guidelines such as no pork 
or no meat on certain days or abstaining from all meals for certain periods),
17
 
and what holidays they find important (such as Rosh Hashanah, Eid al-Adha, 
or Good Friday) are expressions communicating both religious identity and 
the level of commitment that person holds.  In many instances, these 
expressions cannot be changed, at least not without altering the core of one‘s 
identity. 
As members of particular societies, in order to assimilate, we learn to 
filter some individual expression to various degrees.  This is especially true in 
the workplace, in keeping with particular norms of business or professions, as 
well as the public forum, where we want to ―fit in‖ with our community 
members.  However, certain intrinsic characteristics express themselves 
without much alteration, either because they are unalterable to the person or 
because they are too important to try to hide or change.  Said another way, 
people feel they should not have to alter who they are by pretending to be 
something they are not—i.e., ―passing,‖ ―covering,‖ or ―closeting‖ their true 
identities.
18
  This is because religious identity (and consequently its 
expression) is an integrated part of one‘s self.  Although conversion happens 
and new faith beliefs evolve, many people‘s religion is set at a very early age 
and is an authentic expression of their world view.
19
  Much like it is difficult 
for the majority racial group to understand the primary importance of racial 
 
16. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991) (regarding dancing); Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 402 (1989) (regarding flag burning); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–07 (1969) (regarding wearing black armbands). 
17. In Islam, observant Muslims are required to fast for one month out of the year during 
Ramadan (known as Sawm). 
18. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 811–45 (2002) (discussing harm 
experienced by members of the gay and lesbian community as a result of having to mask their sexual 
orientation). 
19. See Ross M. Stolzenberg et al., Religious Participation in Early Adulthood: Age and 
Family Life Cycle Effects on Church Membership, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 84, 98 (1995); Neela Banerjee, 
A Fluid Religious Life is Seen Among Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2008, at A12 (reporting that 
while religion is fluid and highly diverse in America, it remains ―the single most important factor that 
drives American belief attitudes and behaviors‖ (quoting Michael Lindsay, Assistant Director of the 
Center on Race, Religion and Urban Life at Rice University)). 
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identity to a person in a minority race group, secularists often do not 
understand the commitment a religious observer has to her own religious 
identity. 
Asking religious observers to suppress or deny their religious identity can 
be likened to the closeting of certain sexual orientations.  Beyond the ―nature 
or nurture‖ debate, it has been well established that being gay or straight is 
part of one‘s intrinsic being.20  In situations of extreme societal pressures and 
intolerance, some GLBT members of society ―closet‖ themselves by refusing 
to communicate their sexual orientation to others.  Similarly, in many 
professional and educational sectors and culturally elite settings, expressing 
one‘s religious identity is likewise disfavored.  Both should be antithetical to a 
tolerant society.  Yet, we should be just as uncomfortable requiring religious 
observers to hide their expression
21
 because while a person‘s sexual 
orientation rarely requires particular dress, eating, or other observances, 
religious observers‘ expressions of those things are mandatory to orthodox or 
fundamentalist followers.  While closets should be unnecessary in either case, 
tolerant society members should be compelled to protect those who are put to 
an untenable choice between following their faith and avoiding backlash from 
secularists.
22
 
Europe has seen significant recent examples of crackdowns on religious 
expression fundamental to people‘s identities.  Recently, the French 
Parliament adopted a law that forbids teachers and students at public schools 
to wear ostentatious religious signs and apparel.
23
  In Germany, the German 
Federal Constitutional Court made a controversial decision in its ―head scarf 
decision‖ of 2003, when a teacher intending to wear a Muslim head scarf 
during school was rejected by the government of the State Baden-
Wurttemberg.
24
  Public outcry sparked global discussions about religious 
pluralism and the relationship between state and religion. 
As the world‘s population becomes more transient and integrated, and 
diverse cultural identities collide, respect for religious pluralism takes on 
greater importance.  In the early United States, religious diversity was 
 
20. See, e.g., JANIS S. BOHAN, PSYCHOLOGY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION: COMING TO TERMS 
88 (1996); Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the 
Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 506 (1994). 
21. As one commentator eloquently asked, ―Why should an employee be forced to surrender 
his or her right to communicate with coworkers who share a similar cultural world view in the 
language of that culture, at least where no immediate danger to person or property is at stake?‖  BILL 
PIATT, LANGUAGE ON THE JOB: BALANCING BUSINESS NEEDS AND EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 125 (1993). 
22. Prenkert & Magid, supra note 11, at 468. 
23. Law No. 2004-228, Article L. 141-5-1, of Mar. 15, 2004, Journal Officiel de la République 
Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190. 
24. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [federal constitutional court] Sept. 24, 2003, 2 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1436 (F.R.G). 
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minimal compared to today, given the country‘s Christian roots.  But during 
the last century or so, the influx of immigrants bringing many different 
religions has made this topic more critical.  Today, it should come as no 
surprise that many of the world‘s religions are being practiced in America.25  
But where are they being practiced?  Privately, but also in the public sphere 
and in workplaces—and, as Parts III and IV document, the courts treat the 
public sphere and the workplace strikingly differently when it comes to 
religious expression. 
III.  THE SUPREME COURT‘S SHIFT TO STRONG SUPPORT FOR RELIGIOUS 
EXPRESSION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
Protecting religious expression and prohibiting the state from mandating 
any one particular religion to the exclusion of others are fundamental 
foundations of the Constitution‘s Bill of Rights.  The Free Exercise Clause 
promotes religious expression by prohibiting any intentional burden on its 
practice.
26
  Conversely, the Establishment Clause ―protects religious liberty 
and autonomy, including the protection of taxpayers from being forced to 
support religious ideologies to which they are opposed.‖27 
Conservative jurists point out that the Framers intentionally carved out 
protections for religion because of the important place religion holds in 
American life.
28
  As George Washington noted in his Farewell Address, ―[o]f 
all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and 
morality are indispensable supports.‖29  This sentiment remains alive today in 
the hearts of many jurists and increasingly so in the Court‘s religion 
jurisprudence. 
A.  The Supreme Court’s Longstanding Acknowledgment of the Important 
Role Religion Plays in Society 
In religious display cases, the Supreme Court has often pledged its support 
for the role religion plays in American society.  In 1952, Justice Douglas 
 
25. BARRY A. KOSMIN ET AL., THE GRADUATE CENTER OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW 
YORK, AMERICAN RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION SURVEY 2001, available at 
http://www.trincoll.edu/NR/rdonlyres/AFCEF53A-8DAB-4CD9-A892- 
5453E336D35D/0/NEWARISrevised121901b.pdf. 
26. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
27. Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. 
REV. 9, 37 (2004). 
28. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 887 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (―Those who wrote the Constitution believed that morality was essential to the well-being 
of society and that encouragement of religion was the best way to foster morality.‖). 
29. George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: 1789–1897, at 213, 220 (James D. Richardson ed., 
1896). 
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wrote that ―[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a 
Supreme Being.  We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses.  We 
make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of 
man deem necessary.‖30 
Ten years later, the Court declared (in grandiose fashion) that ―[t]he 
history of man is inseparable from the history of religion.‖31  And in 1984, 
Chief Justice Burger wrote that ―[t]here is an unbroken history of official 
acknowledgement by all three branches of government of the role of religion 
in American life from at least 1789.‖32 
In other religious expression contexts, the Court has also shown its 
willingness to support a broad role for religion in society.  In 1983, the Court 
addressed prayer in government proceedings by first acknowledging: 
 
In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more 
than 200 years, there can be no doubt that the practice of 
opening legislative sessions with prayer has become part of 
the fabric of our society.  To invoke Divine guidance on a 
public body entrusted with making the laws is not, in these 
circumstances, an ―establishment‖ of religion or a step toward 
establishment; it is simply a tolerable acknowledgement of 
beliefs widely held among the people of this country.
33
 
 
In First Amendment jurisprudence, religious holiday observers have fared 
well in the Supreme Court, as witnessed in the seminal case of Sherbert v. 
Verner, in which the Court recognized that an employer cannot deny 
employment benefits to an applicant who refused to accept work on her 
Sabbath because such denial violated the Free Exercise Clause.
34
  Instead, the 
Court requires that laws do not ―constrain a worker to abandon his religious 
convictions‖ in the workplace.35 
B.  The Supreme Court Has Strengthened Protection of Religious Expression 
in the Public Sphere 
In Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the Court grapples with how much 
religion government can support or participate in.  During most of the mid-
twentieth century, the prevailing view was to bar most government religious 
 
30. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). 
31. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 434 (1962). 
32. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984). 
33. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983). 
34. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
35. Id. at 410. 
10 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [92:1 
expression, such as voluntary school prayer
36
 and financial support for 
activities that in any way related to religion, such as state aid to religious 
schools for secular subjects.
37
  As was made clear in the seminal case of 
Lemon v. Kurtzman,
38
 the Court placed a high burden on this uneasy 
relationship, requiring that in order for a government activity to pass 
constitutional muster, the government must prove the following: ―First, the 
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or 
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, 
the statute must not foster ‗an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.‘‖39 
The tide in this area began to turn in the late 1980s, when the Court began 
to permit more religion in the public sphere.
40
  The Court allowed some 
religious holiday displays on public property,
41
 more public funds for 
religious student organizations
42
 and parochial schools,
43
 and more access to 
religious groups in public facilities,
44
 including public universities.
45
 
This increasing permission granted by the Court between government and 
religion has recently become more pronounced by returning to the religious 
clauses‘ historical roots and encouraging religion for the betterment of 
society.  At the tail end of a flurry of cases involving religious artifact 
displays in the circuit courts,
46
 in 2005, the Supreme Court issued two 
surprising decisions on the posting of the Ten Commandments on public 
property.
47
  Ten separate opinions were issued in the two cases, reflecting the 
 
36. Engel, 370 U.S. at 424. 
37. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971). 
38. Id. at 612. 
39. Id. at 612–13 (internal citations omitted). 
40. For a comprehensive address on this subject, see Scott A. Moss, Where There’s At-Will, 
There Are Many Ways: Redressing the Increasing Incoherence of Employment At Will , 67 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 295, 336–41 (2005). 
41. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 616 (1989). 
42. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995) (holding that a 
public university violated the Free Speech Clause by denying university funding to a student 
religious publication). 
43. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) (allowing public school teachers to be sent to 
parochial schools to provide remedial education and expressly overruling the contrary holding of 
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)). 
44. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273 (1981). 
45. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 837 (holding that the state violated the First Amendment by 
refusing to provide funds to a Christian student group that published a religious magazine). 
46. See, e.g., Books v. Elkhart County, 401 F.3d 857, 858–59 (7th Cir. 2005); Mercier v. 
Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 695–96 (7th Cir. 2005); Modrovich v. Allegheny County, 
385 F.3d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 2004); Freethought Soc. of Greater Philadelphia v. Chester County, 334 
F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2003); King v. Richmond County, 331 F.3d 1271, 1273–74 (11th Cir. 2003). 
47. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690–91 (2005) (ruling a Ten Commandments 
display on the grounds of the state capitol was constitutional when the display had an undeniable 
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Court‘s splintered views on the subject.  Given the recent personnel changes 
on the Court, taking a close look at the Justices‘ messages on religion is 
instructive as to the role they believe religion plays in private and public life. 
In Van Orden v. Perry, a Court majority allowed a Ten Commandments 
monument to remain on state capitol grounds.
48
  In doing so, the plurality 
opinion (written by Chief Justice Rehnquist) was explicit in wanting to allow 
the state to ―encourage[]‖ religion and ―widen the effective scope of religious 
influence‖: 
 
When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates 
with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public 
events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions.  
For it then respects the religious nature of our people and 
accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs.  To 
hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a 
requirement that the government show a callous indifference 
to religious groups. . . . [W]e find no constitutional 
requirement which makes it necessary for government to be 
hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to 
widen the effective scope of religious influence.
49
 
 
Here, the Court analyzes the constitutionality of a religious monument by 
evaluating the religious traditions of American history, signifying the 
importance they hold.  It does so, however, while still acknowledging that 
religious freedom itself is endangered when government intervention in 
religious matters crosses a certain line. 
In the companion case, McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, the Court 
came to the opposite conclusion.
50
  In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that 
displaying framed copies of the Ten Commandments in a county courthouse 
was improper because the hanging of the religious display was a government 
action with a religious purpose, in violation of the Establishment Clause.
51
 
Justice Breyer, the swing vote in both cases, wrote separately in Van 
Orden.  In doing so, he took pains to reach out to religious observers, stating 
that ―to reach a contrary conclusion here . . . would, I fear, lead the law to 
exhibit a hostility toward religion that has no place in our Establishment 
 
historical meaning); McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 871–72 (2005) (holding 
displays of the Ten Commandments at courthouses violated the Establishment Clause when the 
counties‘ purpose was to emphasize a religious message). 
48. 545 U.S. at 692. 
49. Id. at 684 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1952)). 
50. 545 U.S. at 850–51. 
51. Id. at 870–74. 
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Clause traditions.‖52  As the swing vote, Justice Breyer‘s views and his 
reconciliation of religion in the hearts of many Americans with our nation‘s 
tradition is important.  Justice Breyer framed the issue precisely: how to 
balance the competing interests without creating hostility toward religion.  It 
is exactly this elimination of hostility toward religious expression that must be 
examined by our courts and by our employers. 
With the Court appearing to shift further in the direction of allowing 
public religious expression since these two cases (with Justice O‘Connor, who 
voted to disallow both Ten Commandments displays, being replaced by 
Justice Alito), it is instructional to look at the writings of the Court‘s most 
longstanding advocate of more religion in public life, Justice Scalia. 
In McCreary, Justice Scalia wrote, in his trademark style, a pointed 
dissent for four Justices (Justices Rehnquist, Thomas, and in part Kennedy)—
and, with Justice Alito having since joined the Court, Justice Scalia‘s views 
may well now command a majority.  In his McCreary dissent, Justice Scalia 
argued that the majority‘s assertion that the Establishment Clause mandates 
neutrality toward religion is not supported by the Constitution, nor is it 
consistent with our nation‘s history and tradition.53  It is disappointing to note 
that Justice Scalia‘s dissent in McCreary only goes so far as protecting the 
majority religion‘s role in American society (Judeo-Christianity).  He fails to 
acknowledge the role of minority religions, which as discussed above, play a 
crucial role in many Americans‘ lives.54 
Justice Scalia made clear the Framers‘ view that ―morality was essential to 
the well-being of society and that encouragement of religion was the best way 
to foster morality.‖55  This quote, more than any other, signals the Court‘s 
likely journey forward: encourage religion in order to foster morality in our 
world. 
Ironically, another theme of Justice Scalia‘s dissent is the requirement that 
legal principles be applied consistently.
56
  Yet as discussed below, it is with 
great inconsistency that the Court approaches religion in the workplace, never 
expressing the same respect for religion in employment cases that it has in its 
public sphere cases.  The Ten Commandments cases showcase the Justices‘ 
struggle to agree on exactly where to draw the line between the need to 
 
52. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 704 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
53. 545 U.S. at 885–912 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
54. The failure by Justice Scalia to include minority religions has been noted by other scholars.  
See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice Scalia, the Ten 
Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1098 (2006) 
(―In other words, in Justice Scalia‘s opinion, biblical monotheism is now, has always been, and will 
always be, the favored religion of the United States Constitution.‖). 
55. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 887 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
56. Id. at 890–91. 
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accommodate religious expression and accommodation that goes too far in the 
public sphere.  What is striking is that in its employment law cases, the Court 
largely fails to protect religion in the workplace to any appreciable degree. 
IV.  HOW THE COURTS DENY RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN THE WORKPLACE 
A.  Congress’s Call: Protect Religious Expression of Employees 
Beginning in the Civil Rights era, the United States has endeavored to 
eliminate workplace discrimination for workers who might suffer because of 
certain characteristics.  In 1964, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act made it 
unlawful for an employer to ―discriminate against any individual‖ with 
respect to employment ―because of such individual‘s race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin.‖57  In amending the Act in 1972, Congress went further by 
requiring employers to provide ―reasonable accommodat[ion]‖ of an 
employee‘s religious beliefs unless such accommodation would impose an 
―undue hardship‖ on the employer‘s business.58  Congress took an unusual 
step in defining ―religion‖ for purposes of the accommodation mandate (as 
―includ[ing] all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as 
belief‖)59 but leaving the terms ―reasonable accommodation‖ and ―undue 
hardship‖ undefined. 
A look into the legislative history suggests that the lawmakers‘ intent was 
to protect employees from losing their jobs solely because their religious 
beliefs required them to do certain things, such as observe particular holidays, 
that the rules of their workplace otherwise might not allow.
60
  This 
understanding comes from the two cases that Congress included in the 
legislative record, Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.
61
 and Riley v. Bendix Corp.
62
  
Both cases stand for the proposition that there is no actionable religious 
discrimination so long as employers‘ actions are based on uniformly applied, 
religion-neutral rules or working conditions.  In Dewey, the plaintiff was 
discharged for refusing to work Sundays, and the court‘s holding (which was 
 
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). 
58. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(7), 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000)) 
(―The term ‗religion‘ includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, 
unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee‘s or 
prospective employee‘s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of 
the employer‘s business.‖). 
59. Id. 
60. 118 CONG. REC. 705–06 (1972) (statement of Sen. Jennings Randolph, sponsor and chief 
proponent of the 1972 amendments). 
61. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970). 
62. 330 F. Supp. 583 (M.D. Fla. 1971). 
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affirmed by the Supreme Court)
63
 was that the duty to accommodate based 
just on Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines was 
without statutory basis.
64
  In Riley, the court expressed doubt that employers 
should be forced to accommodate all religious beliefs: ―[S]urely the great and 
diversified types of American business cannot be expected to accede to the 
wishes of every doctrine or religious belief.‖65 
The outcomes of both cases were enough of a concern that Congress 
included them in the legislative record as specific examples of judicial 
reasoning that the accommodation mandate was intended to overturn.
66
  The 
sponsor of the bill, Senator Jennings Randolph, urged Congress to ―assure that 
freedom from religious discrimination in the employment of workers is for all 
time guaranteed by law.‖67  The lawmakers hoped that the accommodation 
mandate would then save employees from having to choose between their 
religious beliefs and their jobs.
68
  The measure passed overwhelmingly in both 
houses.
69
 
The scope and magnitude of this congressional grant of ―positive rights‖70 
for religious observers is profound, especially when contrasted to the lack of 
such protection for other categories, such as race and sex.
71
  Arguably there 
now exist statutory ―accommodation‖ requirements for sex (such as 1993‘s 
Family and Medical Leave Act,
72
 which was conceived largely as an 
accommodation for women with family responsibilities),
73
 race (under the 
―disparate impact‖ doctrine requiring elimination of even neutrally intended 
practices that negatively affect racial minorities, a doctrine the Court 
established in 1971
74
 and Congress strengthened in 1991),
75
 and disability—
but none of these ―accommodation mandates‖76 existed at the time Congress 
 
63. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (per curiam). 
64. Dewey, 429 F.2d at 334. 
65. 330 F. Supp. at 590. 
66. 118 CONG. REC. 705–13 (1972). 
67. 118 CONG. REC. 705 (statement of Sen. Randolph). 
68. Id. 
69. See 118 CONG. REC. 731, 7170, 7572–73. 
70. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the 
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 686 (1992). 
71. For an analysis of the different treatment courts give religion versus sex and race under 
Title VII, see generally Engle, supra note 10. 
72. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2000). 
73. See Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728–31 (2003). 
74. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). 
75. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1080 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000)). 
76. Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 231–32, 277–78 (2000) 
(noting how medical leave requirements and disparate impact similarly are ―accommodation 
mandates‖). 
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legislated the requirement that employers accommodate their employees‘ 
religions. 
The language of the 1972 amendments sought to protect religious 
expression and eliminate the prior case law‘s bright-line difference between 
religious status (protected) and religious conduct (unprotected).  Instead of 
just protecting a worker‘s status as a religious observer (as Congress did for 
racial minorities and for women), this law goes further to also protect the 
conduct associated with such status, such as religious expression and 
observance.
77
  While the law requires that courts balance the interests of 
employers and employees, the statutory language indicates that the balance 
should be weighted in favor of employees, given the textual requirement that 
accommodation be provided unless it would unduly burden the employer.
78
 
B.  The Courts’ Answer: Protect Employer Interests 
The Supreme Court was unwilling to consider the expansive nature of the 
legislative history in interpreting the reasonable accommodation provision.  
Instead, the Court severely limited employers‘ obligations to accommodate 
religious employees.  In 1977‘s Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, the 
employee had a religious objection to working on his Sabbath day.
79
  The 
Court held that an accommodation causes ―undue hardship‖ whenever that 
accommodation results in ―more than a de minimis cost‖ to the employer.80  
The only other Supreme Court decision addressing religious accommodation 
under Title VII was in 1986: Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook.
81
  In 
Ansonia, the Court rejected an employee‘s claim for religious accommodation 
and, in doing so, repudiated the requirement of employers having to reach a 
reasonable accommodation.
82
 
Outside these two opinions, the Court has never addressed religious 
accommodation under Title VII, and those two decisions merely address a 
facet of religious expression: employee requests for accommodation in work 
schedule conflicts.  As the EEOC guidelines suggest, other important conflicts 
between workplace rules and religious observances exist, such as dress and 
grooming requirements, the need for prayer breaks, dietary requirements, and 
prohibitions on certain medical procedures.
83
 
 
77. Equal Opportunities Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000)). 
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000). 
79. 432 U.S. 63, 67 (1977). 
80. Id. at 84.  This definition was later reaffirmed by the Court in Ansonia Board of Education 
v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 67 (1986). 
81. 479 U.S. at 63. 
82. Id. at 74–75 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
83. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1605.2(d)(1) (2004). 
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Most courts post-Hardison and Ansonia have uncritically embraced the 
Court‘s stringent standard of requiring only de minimis accommodations, 
effectively stripping the accommodation down to a ―dead letter.‖84  Indeed, 
courts routinely take a ―per se‖ approach: ―virtually all cost alternatives have 
been declared unduly harsh simply because a loss is involved.‖85  
Additionally, judges are sympathetic to employers‘ arguments that co-
employees would be negatively affected by a proposed accommodation for a 
religious employee, finding such arguments a basis for deeming a requested 
accommodation to cause the employer undue hardship.
86
  In such holdings, as 
one commentator notes, ―Although the Supreme Court set a reasonable 
ceiling, the ceiling appears to have fallen to the floor.‖87 
The well-known case of Wilson v. U.S. West Communications highlights 
this judicial philosophy when courts attempt to balance the needs of religious 
employees and employers‘ business.88  The employee made a religious vow to 
express her opposition to abortion and, in keeping with her religious views, 
wore a button depicting a photograph of a second-trimester fetus (one that 
does not appear to be particularly graphic),
89
 with the slogans ―Stop Abortion‖ 
and ―They‘re Forgetting Someone.‖90  Wilson‘s coworkers opposed her 
wearing of the button at work and called it ―disturbing,‖ claiming that the 
button amounted to harassment and charging the supervisor with harassment 
for failing to stop her from wearing it.
91
  The employer offered three 
accommodations: (1) Wilson could wear the button in her cubicle; (2) she 
could wear the button but cover it while she worked in the office; or (3) she 
could wear a different button that did not have a photograph of a fetus on it.
92
  
When Wilson brought suit, claiming the employer failed to reasonably 
accommodate her, the trial court held that Wilson‘s religious beliefs (although 
sincerely held) did not require her to engage in this expression and that 
 
84. Prenkert & Magid, supra note 11, at 468. 
85. Peter Zablotsky, After the Fall: The Employer’s Duty to Accommodate Employee Religious 
Practices Under Title VII after Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 513, 
547 (1989). 
86. See, e.g., Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 607 (9th Cir. 2004); Chalmers v. 
Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1021 (4th Cir. 1996); Wilson v. U.S. West Commc‘ns, 58 
F.3d 1337, 1341 (8th Cir. 1995). 
87. Sonny Franklin Miller, Religious Accommodation Under Title VII: The Burdenless Burden, 
22 J. CORP. L. 789, 795 (1997). 
88. 58 F.3d at 1338–40. 
89. Picture on file with author. 
90. Wilson, 58 F.3d at 1339. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
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requiring Wilson to cover the button while at work was a reasonable 
accommodation.
93
 
The Eighth Circuit upheld the trial court‘s ruling.  In an opinion reflecting 
the court‘s clear indifference toward Wilson‘s religious beliefs,94 the court 
held that it would be unduly burdensome to allow her to wear her button 
because of the impact her chosen expression had on her coworkers.
95
  The 
court characterized her requested accommodation as requiring her employer 
to ―allow Wilson to impose her beliefs as she chooses.‖96  This ―heckler‘s 
veto‖97 trumped Wilson‘s position that she was expressing her religious 
beliefs and stymied any discussion on what reasonable accommodations did 
exist to minimize the impact of her expression. 
Trial courts are likewise unsympathetic to religious observers in the 
workplace because of the high Hardison undue burden threshold.  Federal 
district courts routinely reject claims of workers to observe their religion 
through their grooming and other observant habits.
98
  In one typical case, 
Hussein v. Pierre Hotel, the district court rejected the claims of a Muslim 
employee to have a beard in accordance with his religious observance by 
ruling that it was an undue hardship on the employer because it ―jeopardiz[ed] 
[the hotel employer‘s] reputation for elegance and cleanliness.‖99  These cases 
exemplify the approach taken by courts in reviewing religious 
accommodation suits: the balance swings in favor of the employer under the 
de minimis standard, and deference is given to any employer‘s concern for 
possible offense over religious expression. 
But isn‘t Title VII‘s religious accommodation mandate, and even the Free 
Exercise Clause, intended to protect these types of religious expressions, even 
if unconventional and outside the mainstream?  And doesn‘t protection of 
religious expression, whether by the Constitution or by Title VII, necessarily 
 
93. Id. at 1340. 
94. See Theresa M. Beiner & John M. A. DiPippa, Hostile Environments and the Religious 
Employee, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 577, 602–03 (1997). 
95. Wilson, 58 F.3d at 1341–42. 
96. Id. at 1341. 
97. Prenkert & Magid, supra note 11, at 497–98. 
98. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sambo‘s of Ga., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, 90–91 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (rejecting 
the claim of a Sikh worker that a uniform grooming policy proscribing facial hair constituted 
unlawful discrimination); see also Khan v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., No. 02 Civ.8893(JCF), 2005 
WL 273027, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2005); Sheikh v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 535, No. Civ. 00 -
1896DWFSRN, 2001 WL 1636504, at *7 (D. Minn. Oct. 18, 2001); Hussein v. Waldorf-Astoria, 134 
F. Supp. 2d 591, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Hussein v. Hotel Employees & Rest. Union, Local 6, 108 F. 
Supp. 2d 360, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Gay v. S.U.N.Y Health Sci. Ctr. of Brooklyn, No. 96-CV-5065 
(JG), 1998 WL 765190, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 1998); EEOC v. Presbyterian Ministries, Inc., 788 
F. Supp. 1154, 1157–58 (W.D. Wash. 1992); Ali v. S.E. Neighborhood House, 519 F. Supp. 489, 497 
(D.D.C. 1981). 
99. 99 Civ. 2715, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4859, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2001). 
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create a religiously pluralistic society in which each person‘s openly religious 
identity could generate disagreement or upset in others?  Anti-discrimination 
laws are not designed to protect majority views; they are written for protection 
of the minority, even if generally unpopular. 
Of course, there is a line at which an employee‘s religious expression 
crosses over into harassment.  In Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., the 
employee, in response to diversity posters, posted Biblical scriptures in his 
work space, including one that condemned homosexuality.
100
  His supervisors 
determined that the scripture postings were offensive and violated the 
company‘s policy prohibiting workplace harassment.101  Subsequently, the 
employee was fired for insubordination when he refused to remove the 
scripture postings.
102
  In response to the employee‘s claims that his employer 
failed to accommodate his religious beliefs, the Ninth Circuit held that it 
would create an undue hardship for the employer to accommodate him by 
allowing him to post messages intended to demean and harass his 
coworkers.
103
 
Both the Wilson and Peterson cases involve balancing the religious 
observer‘s right to express his or her religious self and the right of others not 
to be demeaned and degraded.  In essence, the content of the message matters.  
It is an interesting hypothetical to consider what type of anti-abortion button 
would cross the line into harassment such that Wilson‘s right to 
accommodation would be trumped by the degradation felt by the audience.  
What is required is a true balancing test that recognizes the accommodation 
requirement but only so far as would not devalue another.  In this way, the 
doctrine can take its cues from anti-harassment laws in sex discrimination, as 
described below in Part V.  Such a balancing test is a far cry from the current 
doctrine, in which there essentially is no right to religious expression or 
practice whenever others object. 
Admittedly, it is unlikely that the Court will overtly overturn the Hardison 
decision on its own because it was a statutory interpretation by the Court, and 
―considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory 
construction, where Congress is free to change this Court‘s interpretation of 
its legislation.‖104  The Court, however, can broaden the protections afforded 
employees without admitting a wholesale abandonment
105
 of the de minimis 
 
100. 358 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 2004). 
101. Id. at 602. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 607–08. 
104. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977). 
105. See, e.g., St. Mary‘s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Tex. Dep‘t of Cmty. 
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 
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standard because that standard is, in essence, a balancing test—just one that, 
to date, has been weighted too heavily against employees‘ rights.106 
Because the law protects religious expression and accommodates religious 
observers, the presumption should favor the worker, or at least the test should 
be one of fair balancing, not a strong presumption that employers and 
coworkers need not bear any inconvenience at all.  As stated above, the courts 
have not followed this mandate.  The issue is: How do we draw the line? 
V.  SOLVING THE INCONSISTENCY: THREE APPROACHES TO PROTECTING 
RESPECTFUL RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN THE WORKPLACE 
How should the Court view the newly emerging religious accommodation 
right in order to be in line with the principles of tolerance and inclusion 
outlined above?  Put another way, with religious expression in the public 
sphere enjoying significant support from the Court, how should it balance 
employee religious rights, coworker rights to be free from harassment, and 
employer business interests? 
In accommodating religion in the workplace, courts necessarily face a 
balancing act.  Courts must balance the right of employees to be free to 
express their religious identities with other employees‘ right not to work in a 
hostile environment and employers‘ interest in maintaining a respectful 
atmosphere conducive to productivity.  When faced with having to balance 
competing rights and interests, judges are in the inevitable position of line 
drawing.  So how can courts draw lines that foster workplace norms that 
include tolerating differing forms of religious expression? 
By borrowing from already well-established legal doctrines, the Court can 
balance these rights in a way that meaningfully accommodates respectful 
religious expression while still protecting the rights of others to be free from 
harassment and discrimination if that expression is not respectful of others‘ 
rights and identities. 
This part offers three suggestions of legal tests, none of them mutually 
exclusive or complete answers, to replace the current de minimis standard.
107
  
 
106. This broadening of employee protections might also come about through legislative 
reform, but such a turn of events still would require courts to struggle with the appropriate standard 
for balancing employee religious rights against employer prerogatives.  If new laws are passed to 
strengthen current accommodation laws, such as the WRFA efforts, see supra note 7, the new laws 
would require courts to weigh the competing interests with a stronger emphasis on accommodating 
religious expression.  These new laws would surely be quickly tested in litigation, given the 
balancing of interests such laws require.  Thus, legislative reform would not obviate the need for 
courts to revisit the question of workplace religious accommodations. 
107. See, e.g., Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 67 (1986) (noting that an 
employer is not required to bear more than a de minimis cost in accommodating an employee‘s 
religious beliefs); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710–11 (1985) (ruling a state 
statute that provides Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their 
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First, as subpart A discusses, courts could borrow from workplace harassment 
law to define the point at which one employee‘s religious expression begins to 
infringe upon another‘s right to a nonhostile workplace; harassment law also 
helpfully distinguishes between harassing conduct by supervisors and 
coworkers, deeming the former to be more troubling.  Second, as subpart B 
discusses, courts could follow the mandate of the constitutional Establishment 
Clause concepts of noncoercion and nonendorsement to define the point at 
which employer accommodation of workplace religious expression begins to 
infringe on the rights of workers holding different religious beliefs.  Third, as 
subpart C discusses, courts could look to various constitutional rights 
doctrines and the Americans with Disabilities Act, which do a more balanced 
job of weighing rights and costs, as a way to analyze similar issues regarding 
accommodating employee religious needs. 
A.  Nondegradation and Anti-Harassment Models 
First and foremost, employees should be afforded more freedom to 
express their religious beliefs than what is reflected in the current standard in 
today‘s workplace.  This requires more tolerance for pluralistic religious 
views by coworkers and supervisors.  As American workplaces become more 
diverse, it is inevitable that a growing number of workers will desire to 
express themselves in religious ways in the workplace—and that workplaces 
will feature others with divergent religious views.  Employees may have to 
work around the prayer schedules of other employees whose religious views 
offend them, and the calendars employees post in their cubicles may feature 
different religious quotations.
108
  We could try to avoid these types of 
conflicts by banning such religious content (as current law and workplace 
norms largely do), but in American workplaces that regularly feature quirky 
and varied self-expression, it would be sheer discrimination to ban only 
religious calendars; in workplaces allowing breaks for coffee, cigarettes, etc., 
it would be discrimination to disallow only prayer breaks. 
In this light, much ―accommodation‖ is simply a rule of 
nondiscrimination.
109
  To be sure, coworker disturbances can result from 
allowing such pluralism, but that was the case with the original discrimination 
 
Sabbath violates the Establishment Clause); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 
(1977) (holding an employer is not required to bear more than a de minimis cost in accommodating 
an employee‘s religious beliefs). 
108. See, e.g., Religious Calendars, 
http://www.calendars.com/xq/asp/PID.1/MGID.26/gAffInfo._Phrase/qx/category.htm (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2008) (offering various Christian, Jewish, Buddhist, and other religious or spiritual 
calendars). 
109. See Jolls, supra note 76, at 231. 
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laws‘ mandates that men must interact with women and that whites must 
interact with blacks. 
Religious diversity, like other forms of diversity, can be embraced by 
employers who foster a workplace that allows employees to express their 
religious beliefs fully.  As Douglas A. Hicks writes, in ―constructing 
respectful pluralism,‖ employers should presume inclusion.110  Employers can 
promote inclusion by encouraging a level of understanding and flexibility 
amongst coworkers about diverse religious backgrounds and the 
accompanying expression that stems from such identity.
111
 
Hicks extols ―limiting norms‖ to address the potential pitfalls that can 
emerge in the workplace.
112
  The first is a nondegradation policy prohibiting 
disrespect of coworkers.
113
  If an expression is aimed at degrading another 
(such as the anti-gay message of the employee in the Peterson case), then 
such expression is not protected and should be prohibited. 
Courts can evaluate coworker complaints regarding unwelcome religious 
expression by borrowing from another established legal doctrine: the anti-
harassment framework under Title VII.  In sexual harassment law, there are 
two types of claims: ―quid pro quo‖ and ―hostile work environment.‖114  Quid 
pro quo harassment is when a supervisor‘s sexually discriminatory behavior 
―compels an employee to elect between acceding to sexual demands and 
forfeiting job benefits, continued employment or promotion, or otherwise 
suffering tangible job detriments.‖115  Under the EEOC guidelines, quid pro 
quo sexual harassment occurs when ―submission to or rejection of 
(unwelcome sexual) conduct by an individual is used as the basis for 
employment decisions affecting such individual.‖116  A quid pro quo religious 
harassment suit would likewise analyze whether a supervisor or manager is 
compelling an employee to elect between participating or attending religious 
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proselytizing or practices in order to continue employment or suffer negative 
employment consequences. 
The second harassment model that could be utilized in the religious 
expression context regards hostile work environments.  Hostile work 
environment sexual harassment is defined by the EEOC guidelines as 
―conduct [that] has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an 
individual‘s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or 
offensive working environment.‖117  In the well-known Meritor Savings Bank, 
FSB v. Vinson case, the Supreme Court recognized the hostile work 
environment as sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.
 118
  The Court 
adopted the language of the EEOC guidelines and found that a plaintiff could 
establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment even when no tangible or 
economic benefits are forfeited.
119
  Specifically, the Court articulated the rule 
that hostile environment claims constitute unlawful sexual harassment when 
the allegedly hostile acts are ―sufficiently severe or pervasive ‗to alter the 
conditions of [the victim‘s] employment and create an abusive working 
environment.‘‖120 
Currently, courts will recognize religious hostile work environment claims 
when confronted with overtly egregious harassment.  For example, in Weiss v. 
United States, the employee was subjected to continuous religious slurs from 
both his coworkers and supervisor.
121
  The religious slurs included ―such 
taunts as ‗resident Jew,‘ ‗Jew faggot,‘ ‗rich Jew,‘ ‗Christ killer,‘ ‗nail him to 
the cross,‘ and ‗you killed Christ, Wally, so you‘ll have to hang from the 
cross.‘‖122  The court recognized the hostile work environment claim, as the 
obviously demeaning and patently offensive comments constituted 
―[c]ontinuous abusive language, [which] whether racist, sexist, or religious in 
form, can often pollute a healthy working environment.‖123  Most 
commentators would agree that this was not a close call given the overtly 
hostile and demeaning nature of the slurs. 
The true test will be the extent to which courts will recognize religious 
harassment claims in cases with behavior that is less outrageous, but still goes 
beyond the workplace norms of inclusiveness and respect for religious 
pluralism in the workplace.  For example, in a workplace that allows all forms 
of idle conversation, an employee discussing her religious beliefs during 
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breaks ordinarily would not be considered harassing.  But if other employees 
perceive, with reasonable basis, that the religious employee is degrading or 
insulting them, or is pushing too hard for others to adopt her beliefs (such as a 
fervent proselytizer who does not take ―no‖ for an answer), then the religious 
speech could approach the level of actionable harassment, and an employer 
would be entitled to put a halt to it before it became ―pervasive‖ enough to 
amount to a violation of the harassment prohibition. 
In such situations, the courts could do more to protect the expression of 
religious employees than is currently allowed, while remaining mindful of the 
limiting principles described here. 
B.  Noncoercion and Nonendorsement Models 
Another limiting principle to the general acceptability of religious 
expression is one of noncoercion.  Workplace policies can require employers 
not to use their authority (both formal and informal) over subordinates to 
influence them with regard to their religious beliefs.
124
  Likewise, employees 
can be discouraged from imposing dogmatic views onto their coworkers.  This 
includes ―proselytizing‖ and other forms of coercive efforts by workers with 
the aim of changing another‘s beliefs about religion.  A religious supervisor 
could not require an atheist or any other employee to attend prayer meetings 
or be fired, although the supervisor has a religious expression right.
125
 
This would also include prohibiting employers from endorsing one 
particular religion over others in the workplace.  Much like applying the 
Establishment Clause model to private employers, this limiting principle 
would combat the coercive effects of an ―institutional preference for a specific 
religious worldview.‖126  Courts can borrow from the Establishment Clause 
model for evaluating the effects of employers‘ religious expression by using 
the ―endorsement‖ test. 
After the Lemon test fell out of favor, the Court began assessing 
entanglement of government with religion by asking whether government 
action ―constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion.‖127  Under this 
test, courts can examine employers‘ religious expression by asking if the 
expression endorses or disapproves of one particular religion over others.  For 
example, if an employer allowed employees to use a break room for all kinds 
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of personal purposes, from baby showers to prayer meetings, then those 
prayer meetings would be a reasonable accommodation, not an impermissible 
―endorsement‖ of religion; as discussed above, courts have ruled exactly to 
the contrary under the de minimis standard of workplace religious 
accommodation,
128
 but courts have allowed the same sort of neutral ―open 
room‖ policies in Establishment Clause cases about the use of public 
property.
129
  However, if an employer had a special room for Christian prayer 
groups exclusively, this would violate the endorsement test because it 
constitutes an endorsement of one particular religion over another.  However, 
if the prayer room was open for all religious denominations, including 
meditation for Buddhists, prayer for Muslims, or chanting for Hindus, then the 
expression would not be endorsing one religion over another and would be 
acceptable religious expression. 
The reason that employers‘ religious expression would be curtailed more 
than employee religious expression under this test is because of the inherent 
power dynamic at play in the employment relationship that so heavily favors 
employers.
130
  Because employees are in a subservient role vis-à-vis their 
employer, the employer cannot go too far in expressing one particular religion 
because of the chilling effect it has on employee religious expression.  If an 
employer promoted its own religious views, the coercive effect of that 
seeming ―endorsement‖ would prevent employees from expressing their own 
religious beliefs if they diverged from their employer‘s religion.  Accordingly, 
courts can borrow the Establishment Clause test of ―coercion‖ for these 
situations, which allows government religious expression as long as it does 
not ―coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or 
otherwise act in a way which ‗establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, 
or tends to do so.‘‖131 This test would be triggered to stop the coercive effects 
associated with the power imbalance imbued in employment relationships.  
However, while this test solves the power imbalance of employer religious 
expression, it does not reach the problem of employee religious expression, 
which would be chilled by such a restrictive test if applied to it. 
With the aforementioned principles of religious pluralism in mind, courts 
can encourage employers to institutionalize policies that accommodate 
respectful religious expression in the workplace.  Grievances (both internally 
and in the courts) can be evaluated based on principles that balance workplace 
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ideals, such as accommodation, equality, neutrality, tolerance, and inclusion.  
These five ideals, as outlined by Steven D. Jamar,
132
 would foster a workplace 
that allows for religious expression without fear of coercion and intimidation. 
For example, if coworkers were tolerant of the religious expressions of 
their fellow employees, there could be less of the sort of conflict created in the 
Wilson case.
133
  Whether the fetus button she wore was degrading or should be 
tolerated is a content-based determination, but one which must be analyzed, 
first by the employer and, if necessary, by the courts.  If the workplace norms 
had advanced such that workers were more regularly exposed to, and 
therefore were acculturated to be more tolerant of, opposing viewpoints, the 
conflict might never have inflamed to the point at which litigation became 
necessary. 
C.  Undue Burden Test 
The balancing of religious expression in the workplace requires the courts 
to assess what is truly ―unduly burdensome‖ for employers to undertake to 
accommodate their employees.  In reevaluating what ―unduly burdensome‖ 
means in a pluralistic society, the Court need look only to its ―undue burden‖ 
jurisprudence in various fundamental constitutional rights.  Analogizing 
workers‘ statutory religious rights to fundamental constitutional rights makes 
sense for two reasons.  First, religion is given special protection under a 
variety of constitutional and statutory doctrines and is especially important to 
the current conservative bloc of Justices, as outlined above.  Second, a 
person‘s religious identity, although mutable, is a fundamental personal 
decision on par with recognized fundamental rights such as marriage and 
procreation and arguably more important to many people than association and 
political speech. 
Fundamental rights under the Constitution traditionally merit strict 
scrutiny, but given that Title VII religious rights extend further than 
constitutional religious rights (both by reaching into private workplaces and 
by requiring accommodations against neutral workplace rules),
134
 it is 
appropriate to use the more lenient ―undue burden‖ test applicable to 
constitutional rights such as abortion that do not require restrictions to be 
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justified with strict scrutiny.
135
  Similar language—―undue hardship‖—is used 
in Title VII,
136
 and the lawmakers arguably used that language for a reason: to 
provide substantial protection to religious workers‘ rights.137 
Under an ―undue burden‖ standard, limits on religious expression would 
be lawful only if such limitations were not a ―direct legal obstacle‖138 to 
expressing one‘s religion, or put another way, if the limitations on religious 
expression had a purpose or ―effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the 
path.‖139  Accordingly, laws or employer policies and practices that were a 
substantial obstacle to religious expression in the workplace would be struck 
down. 
Employers may argue that accommodating religious workers simply costs 
too much.  As commentator Achim Seifert has acknowledged, religious 
pluralism principles are effective in the private work sphere only so long as 
they are compatible with the ultimate goal of business: profit making.
140
  
While these principles are seemingly not inconsistent with profit seeking, the 
courts are likewise sympathetic to the employer‘s interest in the productivity 
lost as these interests are sorted out.
141
  There are three responses to courts‘ 
concern about putting employers‘ profits at risk. 
First, eradicating discrimination in the workplace often comes with a price 
tag, but courts still mandate compliance in the interest of furthering a just 
society (or at least in the interest of effectuating a clear congressional intent to 
further a just society by imposing a rights mandate on businesses).  For 
example, in the disability context, the Americans with Disabilities Act 
requires that employers comply with its provisions for equal accessibility for 
disabled employees.
142
  Although these provisions can cost employers 
thousands, or tens of thousands, of dollars per accommodated employee,
143
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the courts have upheld this costly burden because of the justice it serves in 
assuring equal access for all. 
Indeed, the disabled worker is unable to work in a particular workplace if 
accommodations are not made.  In workplaces that fail to accommodate 
religious workers, these workers are faced with a similar dilemma of lost job 
opportunities because they are unwilling to abandon their religious identity 
and the requirements of that identity.  Even though one might point out that 
disabled workers do not choose their disability, as stated above, religious 
workers do not view an abandonment of their religion as a ―choice‖ able to be 
made at will. 
Additionally, where a requested religious accommodation is relatively 
modest, courts should not hesitate to require it when the only objection is that 
it would make other employees unhappy.  After all, courts have never 
recognized an ―upset coworker‖ exception to anti-discrimination laws, even to 
accommodation mandates.  Rejecting religious accommodation because 
coworkers are upset is no more justified than letting coworker preferences 
trump requirements of disability accommodations, medical leave, anti-
harassment policies, etc. 
This argument against a ―coworker veto‖ does not diminish the point 
made above that religious expression that is aimed at demeaning secularist 
workers should not be protected or accommodated.  Like prohibited hate 
speech (in the constitutional context) or sexual harassment (in the statutory 
context), speech and conduct that courts find violate these principles should 
not be deemed acceptable (and protectable) religious expression.  In this way, 
content matters and, as in other content-based inquiries, courts will have to 
balance the rights of religious expression with the rights of other workers to 
be free from harassment. 
Lastly, a proactive approach for employers to create a respectful 
workplace for religious diversity is arguably good for business, as well as 
good for employees.  As any good motivational speaker will tell you: Happy 
employees are productive employees.
144
  In order to keep both the religious 
observer and the secularist happy, employers can promote a set of ―best 
practices‖ guidelines145 for managers and supervisors that incorporate the 
values of inclusion and nondiscrimination outlined here. 
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However, this approach does require an expansion of what is currently 
considered acceptable workplace behavior and discussion.  In an expansive 
and healthy workplace, workers are free to express religious views, as they do 
views on traditional American topics of conversation: politics, sports, and 
family, to name a few.  Religious garb or prayer breaks can be met, not with 
suspicion of coercion, but with the openness that accompanies culturally 
acceptable identities, such as being married with children, or an animal lover, 
or a rabid fan for a particular baseball team.  Although a single worker might 
feel devalued with prominent photographic displays of spouses and children, a 
mother of six children might feel slighted by a population-control advocate, 
an animal lover might be horrified by a hunting aficionado, and a Mets fan 
might dislike the overbearing Yankees fan with excessive team paraphernalia, 
one set of these workers does not get to control the workplace to prohibit the 
other‘s expression.  Likewise, secularist workers should not have the ability to 
silence religiously observant workers. 
Courts have the tools to balance the competing interests of employees‘ 
right to express their religion with employers‘ interest in productivity.  By 
using a true ―undue burden‖ test, instead of a de minimis standard, courts 
could enforce the true legislative intent of the accommodation laws.  Further, 
anti-discrimination and anti-harassment laws already in place can be used to 
curb the threat of coercive expression.  These already familiar approaches 
support the implementation of workplace norms that include respectful 
religious pluralism. 
Through this self-correction, the courts will be addressing three important, 
converging issues identified in this Article: (1) workplaces are increasingly 
sites of important expression; (2) workplaces are increasingly sites of broad 
religious diversity; and (3) employers cannot expect workers to cover or sever 
their religious identities at their door. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
With growing religious diversity in the workplace, the clear congressional 
intent to support religious accommodation, and the Supreme Court‘s 
increasing recognition of religion‘s role in society, it is time for courts to 
refine their balancing act.  It is time to move away from the Hardison position 
of allowing employers to stamp out employee religious expression with only a 
de minimis burden showing.  Instead, courts must adhere to a new balancing 
act, one which encourages employers to make a strong showing of an actual 
burden if denying religious accommodation to their employees.  But with this 
rise of recognizing that religious observers have expressive rights, even in 
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private workplaces, comes with it the inevitable task of line drawing.  What 
should the outcome be when religious observers express themselves 
religiously but disrespectfully in workplaces, and when do the rights of 
secularists become trumped or devalued? 
Courts have the tools by which to balance these interests already.  First, 
workplace harassment law provides the framework to define the point at 
which one employee‘s religious expression begins to infringe upon another‘s 
right to a nonhostile workplace and distinguishes between harassing conduct 
by supervisors and coworkers.  Second, the constitutional Establishment 
Clause concepts of noncoercion and nonendorsement help to define the point 
at which employer accommodation of workplace religious expression begins 
to infringe on the rights of workers holding different religious beliefs.  Third, 
courts should look to various constitutional rights doctrines and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act to analyze the careful balancing of the costs 
and rights associated with accommodating employee religious needs. 
This new perspective results in a commingling of two important concepts: 
first, fostering respectful religious pluralism and freedom of religious 
expression; second, strengthening accommodation rights to allow anti-
discrimination laws to be fully realized.  Because the law protects religious 
expression and accommodates religious observers, the presumption should 
favor the worker‘s religious expression unless it demeans or devalues another 
worker‘s beliefs.  Balancing of interests is nothing new; giving true 
accommodation to religious workers is.  The test should be one of fair 
balancing, not a strong presumption that employers and coworkers need not 
bear any inconvenience at all.  This self-correction harkens back to the 
original intent of the First Amendment, as well as the congressional intent of 
Title VII. 
